The purpose of this paper is to examine empirically the real options to shutdown, startup, and abandon existing production assets using detailed information for 1,121 individual power plants for the period 2001-2009, a total of 8,189 plant-year observations. We find strong evidence of real options effects. We find that uncertainty about the outcome of ongoing deregulation in retail electricity markets (i) decreases the probability of shutting down operating plants, and, (ii) decreases the probability of starting up plants which were previously shutdown. JEL CLASSIFICATION CODES: D81, E22, G31, L51, L94, AQ41, Q48.
I. Introduction
Do managers take account of real options effects when making capital budgeting decisions? Survey results reported in the literature suggest that, for the most part, the answer is no! Graham and Harvey (2001) report that only 26.6% of survey respondents "always or almost always" incorporate real options into project evaluation. Triantis (2005) cites surveys of CFOs and senior executives which find that 10-15% and 9%, respectively, use real options techniques. According to McDonald (2006) , less than 25% of firms use the real options approach to capital budgeting. Block (2007) surveys Fortune 1000 companies and finds that 14.3% were using real options techiques. Baker, Dutta, and Saadi (2011) survey Canadian firms and find that only 16.8% report that they use real options for capital budgeting, ranking it last among nine capital budgeting techniques. They conclude by saying (p.27), "More than 30 years after the term was coined, real options have yet to be adopted by most companies as a tool for strategic decision making."
Even if managers do not make explicit use of real options techniques, McDonald (2000) suggests they might utilize "rules of thumb" which account for uncertainty and allow for optimal or near optimal decisions. Kellogg (2010) finds that oil well drilling firms do respond to changes in price volatility despite the fact that (p.32) " ... it seems unlikely that they are formally solving Bellman equations." He suggests that these firms have decision heuristics which approximate real options decision making processes.
The purpose of this paper is to test for real options effects in the decisions to shutdown, startup, and abandon existing production assets, which we refer to collectively as status changes. We conduct our tests using detailed information for 1,121 individual power plants. To the best of our knowledge, the data are unique in scope and level of detail. We provide strong evidence that decision makers take account of cash flow uncertainty and regulatory uncertainty when making shutdown, startup, and abandonment decisions.
The difference between the market values of electricity and fuel is referred to as the spark spread. A power plant comprises a series of call options written on the spark spread. An increase in spark spread volatility therefore increases the option value of the plant. We show that an increase in spark spread volatility (i) decreases the probability of shutting down an operating plant, (ii) increases the probability of starting up a plant which was previously shutdown, and, (iii) decreases the probability of abandoning a plant which was previously shutdown.
We add to the recent stream of literature which focuses on the effects of regulatory uncertainty on the managerial decisions. 3 We find that during times of regulatory uncertainty plants which are operating are less likely to be shutdown and plants which were previously shutdown are less likely to startup. Under traditional regulation, retail customers are captive. Retail deregulation allows customers to choose their electricity supplier. The advent of retail deregulation has the potential to significantly change the demand for electricity faced by any individual supplier. Uncertainty about the outcome of deregulation means that owners are unsure about the future profitability of their plants. Plant owners therefore rationally delay the decision to shutdown an operating plant, and the decision to startup a plant which was previously shutdown, until the outcome of the deregulation process is more certain.
We find no evidence that regulatory uncertainty affects abandonment decisions. Abandoning a plant which was previously shutdown has little effect on the cash flows of the firm because the plant is "out-ofthe-game" already.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Section II provides a review of existing literature and serves to motivate our empirical exercise. Section III details the data. In Section IV we define shutdown, startup, and abandonment in our sample. In Sections V and VI we present the empirical results.
Section VII concludes.
II. Literature Review
The theory of real options predicts that, in the face of irreversible switching costs and uncertainty in cash flows, major changes in assets are subject to hysteresis, and can be structured as options. For example, the opportunity to invest in, shutdown (or mothball), restart, or abandon a production asset can be cast as call and put options on the present value of the cash flows of the asset. Robichek and Horne (1967) recognize that the "possibility of future abandonment" is an important part of the value of any potential project and that it must be accounted for in the capital budgeting process. 4 McDonald and Siegel (1985) develop a methodology for valuing risky investments when the firm has the option to shutdown the project after it has been constructed. They introduce uncertainty in output prices and input costs. Brennan and Schwartz (1985) specialize a real options model for the case of a commodity mine and study optimal policies for shutting down an operating mine.
Empirical studies on real options include Quigg (1993) , who uses data on land transactions to show that a real options model has some explanatory power for market prices, over and above net present value. Berger, Ofek, and Swary (1996) examine empirically the abandonment option of the firm as a whole and find that the market value of the firm is increasing in firm exit value. Bulan, Mayer, and Somerville (2009) investigate condominium development and find that increased volatility reduces probability of investment, and that a real options model explains the data better than a model of risk aversion. Kellogg (2010) finds that Texas oil companies reduce their drilling activity when volatility rises, and that the magnitude of this change is consistent with real options theory. Moel and Tufano (2002) evaluate empirically the predictions of the Brennan and Schwartz (1985) model by examining the shutdown and startup decisions for 285 gold mine properties for the [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] time period. They find that a real options model describes well the empirical data. Our work differs from that of Moel and Tufano (2002) in important ways. First, we focus directly on status changes. Second, we include a measure of regulatory uncertainty. Third, we also examine the option to abandon a plant. Finally, our dataset is more detailed and has approximately four times as many observations as the data used by Moel and Tufano (2002) .
III. Data
In this section we describe the sample data in detail. The primary data sources are the Energy Information Administration, NYMEX, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and wholesale electricity market system operators. Interest rate data come from the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank. Table I presents summary statistics for the plant-specific variables in our sample, while Table II presents summary statistics for macroeconomic, real options, and firm-specific variables.
The main data source for this paper is Form 860 collected and disseminated by the Energy Information Administration (hereafter EIA), the statistical arm of the U.S. Department of Energy. Form 860 contains detailed data for nearly every power plant in the United States, both existing and planned. We consider plants from three major wholesale electricity markets -Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM), the New England Independent System Operator (ISO-NE), and the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) -for the 2001-2009 time period. 5 The choice of areas and sample period is driven by (i) the availability of electricity price data and (ii) significant changes in Form 860 beginning in 2001. We focus on "peaking" plants as these should be more subject to the factors expected to influence shutdown, startup, and abandonment decisions. 6 The final data set contains 8,189 plant-year observations on 1,121 individual plants.
A. Plant Efficiency
The efficiency of a power plant is measured by its heat rate. Kovenock and Phillips (1997) emphasize the importance of controlling for plant efficiency and industry capacity utilization in investment and abandonment decisions.
B. Spark Spread Volatility
Consider plant i which has heat rate HR i , burns fuel j, and is located in region k. We calculate the plantspecific spark spread, or profit margin, expressed in units of dollars per megawatt hour ($/MWh), for day n as
where P elec k,n is the day n electricity price ($/MWh) in region k and P f uel j,n is the day n fuel price ($/MMBtu) for fuel j. Daily spot prices for New York Harbor No. 2 Oil and NYMEX Henry Hub natural gas are taken from the EIA website. Electricity prices come from the PJM, ISO-NE, and NYISO websites. 9 Spark spread volatility is then the standard deviation of the daily spark spread over year t.
where T is the number of days in year t.
C. Supply and Demand Data
Because electricity cannot be stored, available supply (i.e., capacity) must always exceed contemporaneous demand in order to prevent blackouts. 10 We measure supply adequacy by reserve margin. Reserve margin for region k and year t (RM k,t ) is defined to be Projected reserve margin serves as our proxy for expected future profitability. Lack of storability implies that, when demand approaches available supply, electricity prices increase at an increasing rate. 11
The lower is the reserve margin, the less excess capacity there is in the system, and the higher are wholesale electricity prices. Thus projected reserve margin acts as an (inverse) proxy for expected future profitability of the plant. Low reserve margins imply high future profitability and vise versa. 12 
C.1. Time Sequence of Data Availability

D. Regulatory Uncertainty
Before the advent of retail competition in the U.S., customers located in a particular utility's service territory were captive customers of that utility. The utility was required to maintain enough resources to meet the demand of its captive customers. Deregulation of retail electricity markets allows customers to choose electricity suppliers. The prospect of retail competition leaves utilities in the position of possibly losing (or gaining) a significant portion of existing demand. If the utility's neighbors have lower cost generation available, and the utility loses some of its existing demand when retail competition is implemented, then a plant which was economic when used to meet native demand in the regulated world might not be needed under retail competition. Also, retail competition might mean that a plant which would not have run under regulation will be profitable again.
Deregulation of retail electricity markets in the U.S. is taking place at the state level. The EIA publishes a descriptive summary of state-level deregulation. This information, supplemented by state utility commission information, allows the construction of a state-level retail competition index. 13 The index is a discrete variable taking on values from 1 to 5, which correspond to:
1. no activity, 2. investigation underway, 3. competition recommended, 4. law passed requiring retail competition, and,
competition implemented.
The index measures the level of competition in the retail market. Our interest in is uncertainty. When the competition index takes a value of two, there is uncertainty about whether the state will implement retail competition. When the index takes a value of three, there is uncertainty about the form retail competition will ultimately take. We define a regulatory uncertainty indicator variable (REGU NCERT) which takes a 13 A similar index was developed independently by Delmas and Tokat (2005) .
value of one when the competition index above is equal to either two or three, and which takes a value of zero otherwise.
Consistent with real options theory, we expect firms to be less likely to make changes in the status of existing generators when there is uncertainty about the outcome of retail deregulation. Approximately 20.5% 14 of our total samples observations occur during a period of regulatory uncertainty. As detailed in Tables V and VII , there are a total of 338 instances of shutdowns, startups, and abandonments in our sample. Of these, only 11, or 3.25%, take place during periods of regulatory uncertainty.
E. Portfolio Effects
The decision to shutdown, startup, and/or abandon a plant may depend on the size of the firm. A firm which owns a large amount of capacity may be able to reassign workers when it makes the decision to shutdown or abandon an existing plant, whereas a smaller firm may be forced to layoff workers. As pointed out by Moel and Tufano (2002) , large firms have greater opportunity to subsidize less profitable plants. We use two measures of firm size, the total capacity owned by the firm and the total number of plants owned by the firm. The summary statistics in Table II show that there is a great deal of variation in the size of the firms in our sample.
IV. Status Change Definitions
For our purposes, the key variable from EIA Form 860 is the "status" of the plant. The relevant status codes are
• OP -operating,
• SB -standby, and, 14 In Table II we report that the mean value of the regulatory uncertainty variable is 0.217. In the calculation of the statistics in Table II we use only one observation per state-year, not every observation.
• RE -retired.
Details are found in Appendix C.
A plant which has status code OP is available for operation. A plant which has status code SB has been shutdown, or mothballed. A plant which has status RE has been abandoned, or retired, and cannot return to service.
Consider a plant which is operating (status OP) in the current year. Next year, the plant may either continue to operate (remain in status OP) or move to standby (SB). 15 We define a "shutdown" to be movement from status OP in year t to status SB in year t + 1. 16 Table III Consider a plant which was previously shutdown, i.e., a plant which is on standby (SB) in the current year. Next year the plant may either startup (move to status OP), remain shutdown (SB), or be abandoned (move to status RE). We define a "startup" to be movement from status SB in year t to status OP in year t + 1. We define an "abandonment" to be movement from status SB in year t to status RE in year t + 1. were abandoned. For the entire sample, there are a total of 184 instances of startup and 78 instances of abandonment. 15 While it is possible to move directly from status OP (operating) to status RE (retired), such moves are rare and are not driven purely by spark spread economics. 16 It is conceivable that the status of a plant could change more than once per year. The annual frequency of our data is not fine enough to observe such changes. Our results therefore provide a lower bound on the exercise of managerial flexibility. We thank Afzal Siddiqui for pointing this out.
V. Shutdown
In this section we examine the decision to shutdown an operating plant, i.e., to move from status code OP to status code SB. Table V presents comparative univariate statistics for plants which were shutdown and those which continued to operate. The descriptive variables are divided into four categories -macroeconomic, firm-specific, plant-specific, and real options, i.e., measures of uncertainty. The last column presents differences. All of these differences are significant at the 5% or 1% level.
Beginning with the macro variables, plants tend to be shutdown when projected reserve margins are high. High reserve margins imply low future profitability. Plants are more likely to be shutdown when expected future profitability is low.
We expect interest rates to have a positive relationship with shutdowns. The higher are interest rates, the lower is the present value of future cash flows, and the higher should be the probability that a plant will shutdown. The univariate statistics in Table V suggest exactly the opposite -plants tend to shutdown when interest rates are lower. However, reserve margin and interest rates are negatively correlated. 17 We believe that, when considered in isolation, interest rates are simply proxying for reserve margin. The multivariate analysis below confirms this conjecture. When we control for reserve margin, the interest rates and shutdown probabilities are positively related.
The firm-specific variables are the total capacity (in units of MW) owned by the firm and the total number of plants owned by the firm. Table V indicates that firms which shutdown plants tend to be much smaller than firms which continue to operate existing plants, as measured both by total capacity owned and by total number of plants. We think there are at least two potential explanations for this effect. First, smaller firms have fewer opportunities to subsidize less profitable plants. Second, and perhaps more important, many of the small firms in our sample are firms whose primary business is not electricity generation. 18 17 Slower economic growth means slower growth in the demand for electricity and therefore higher reserve margins. Slower economic growth also tends to reduce interest rates. In our data the simple correlation coefficient between interest rates and reserve margin is -0.35. In PJM, where the majority of status changes take place, the correlation is -0.60. 18 Of the 212 total firms in the sample, 27 own only one plant.
These firms do not have the same level of in-house maintenance expertise as do firms whose primary business is electricity generation. When the plants owned by these firms age and become relatively less cost effective, it is more costly for these firms to undertake the maintenance required to keep the plant operational, hence they are more likely to shutdown the plant.
Turning to the plant-specific variables, plants which shutdown are on average older, less efficient, and smaller than plants which continue to operate.
Spark spread volatility and the regulatory uncertainty indicator variable are both measures of uncertainty and ought to matter if real options effects are important. Consistent with real options theory, the table shows that shutdowns are more likely when (i) spark spread volatility is lower, and, (ii) there is less uncertainty about the outcome of retail deregulation. The differences are large.
On average spark spread volatility for plants which shutdown is 31% less than spark spread volatility for plants which continue to operate. The regulatory uncertainty data is even more striking. Of the total 8,189 observations, 20.5% occur during times of regulatory uncertainty. Table V 
A. Binary Logit Regression
Consider plant i which burns fuel j and is located in region k. We begin our multivariate analysis using a binary logit specification, as follows. 19
where
is an indicator variable which takes the value of zero if plant i was operating in year t and operating in year t + 1, and which takes a value of one if plant i was operating in year t and shutdown in year presents the change in the probability of a shutdown when the variable changes from zero to one. We begin by including each independent variable separately. Each coefficient is significant and the signs are consistent with the summary statistics in Table V .
Analyzing each variable separately allows us to get a feel for which of the variables is most important.
Expected future profitability has the most explanatory power for the shutdown decision. Among the individual regressions, the RM regression has the greatest psuedo-R 2 (14.3%), the greatest log-likelihood, and
the lowest values for both information criteria statistics, AIC and BIC. The coefficient on RM is positive indicating that plants are more likely to be shutdown when there is a greater excess of existing capacity.
As discussed above, higher reserve margins imply lower wholesale electricity prices and therefore less valuable plants. Plants tend to shutdown when expected future profitability is low.
The coefficients for the real options variables SPRDSD and REGU NCERT are negative and significant.
Increases in spark spread volatility and regulatory uncertainty each reduce the probability of shutting down an operating plant.
C. Full Regression
The last column of Table VI shows that, with one exception, the insights gained from the individual regressions continue to hold when all the independent variables are included in the same regression. 20 Most importantly, the coefficients on SPRDSD and REGU NCERT remain negative and significant. Consistent with our priors, increases in either spark spread volatility or regulatory uncertainty decrease the probability of shutting down an operating plant even when we control for other factors likely to affect the shutdown decision. Figure 1 plots the probability of shutdown as a function of reserve margin, based on the regression results from Table VI . The top panel presents the probability of shutdown for the cases of regulatory uncertainty (blue circles) and no uncertainty (red squares). At low values of reserve margin (high future 20 The exception is that the sign of T 10 changes from negative to positive, consistent with our priors about the effect of interest rates on the option to shutdown. profitability), the probability of shutting down an operating plant is near zero regardless of the regulatory environment.
At higher values of reserve margin (lower values of future profitability) the probability of shutting down an operating plant increases dramatically, but only for the case in which there is no regulatory uncertainty.
In the presence of regulatory uncertainty the probability of shutting down an operating plant is small for any value of reserve margin. Uncertainty in the regulatory environment translates in to uncertainty about plant profitability, hence plant owners are more hesitant to shutdown operating plants.
The bottom panel of Figure 1 presents the probability of shutting down an operating plant as a function of reserve margin for three values of spark spread volatility -$10/MWh (blue circles), $30/MWh (red squares), and $100/MWh (green triangles). 21 When reserve margin is low (future profitability is high), the probability of shutting down an operating plant is small, irrespective of spark spread volatility. In this case the spark spread options which comprise the plant are effectively in-the-money and optionality constitutes a relatively small part of the plant's value, so spark spread volatility is less important to the shutdown decision.
When reserve margin is high (future profitability is low), the spark spread options which comprise the plant are out-of-the-money, optionality is the main source of the plant's value, and spark spread volatility is very important to the shutdown decision. When spark spread volatility is high, the option value of the plant is correspondingly high and the probability of shutdown is near zero regardless of reserve margin.
When reserve margin is high and spark spread volatility is low, the options which comprise the plant are both out-of-the-money and the volatility of the underlying asset (the spark spread) is low, rendering the options nearly worthless. As a result, the probability of shutting down an operating plant increases in reserve margin. As Table VI and Figure 1 make clear, these effects are both statistically and economically significant.
In this section we examine the decisions to startup and abandon a plant which was previously shutdown. 
A. Startup
Consider first plants which startup. Plants tend to startup when projected reserve margins are low and therefore expected future profitability is high. Consistent with the discussion above, we expect startups to be more likely when interest rates are low and therefore the present value of future cash flows is high. Table   VII shows exactly the opposite -startups tend to happen when interest rates are high, again reflecting the negative correlation between interest rates and reserve margin. Table VII also shows that firms which restart plants are not significantly different in size than firms for which plants remain shutdown, as measured by either total capacity or total number of plants.
Plants which startup are on average younger, more efficient, and larger than plants which remain shutdown. According to the theory, important determinants of the decision to shutdown and/or startup a plant are the cost involved doing so, both the one time costs and continuing costs. We proxy for startup costs by calculating the amount of time (in years) that a plant has been shutdown. The assumption is that a plant which has been shutdown for a long period of time has higher startup costs than an otherwise similar plant which has been shutdown for a shorter length of time. 22 Plants which startup have been shutdown for a shorter period of time (1.16 years) that plants which remain shutdown (2.55 years) indicating that plants which startup have lower startup costs than plants which remain shutdown.
Turning to the real options variables, Table VII shows that plants which startup have higher spark spread volatility than plants which remain shutdown. Higher spark spread volatility means that the options which comprise the plant have significant option value which can be captured if the plant is operational, therefore increasing the probability of startup.
Table VII also shows that startups tend to occur when uncertainty about the outcome of retail deregulation is low. Of the 184 total instances of startup in our sample, only eight ( 
B. Abandonment
Next consider plants which are abandoned. The last two columns of Table VII show that plants tend to be abandoned when projected reserve margins are high and expected future profitability therefore is low.
Firms which abandon plants tend to be much (three to four times) larger than those which do not. The size of the firm may well serve as a proxy for abandonment costs. A large electric utility which wants to build a new plant may have a very hard time locating and obtaining permits for a new site. A much less expensive and less time consuming alternative is to use an existing site. By abandoning an existing plant, the utility can free up space for the new plant. The abandonment cost in this case is positive, it looks like a salvage value.
Abandonments take place when spark spread volatility is low and when uncertainty about retail deregulation is low. Specifically, spark spread volatility for plants which are abandoned is 27.5% less than spark spread volatility for plants which remain shutdown. Only two of the total 78 abandonments ( 2 78 = 0.026) in the sample took place during times of regulatory uncertainty.
C. Startup and Abandonment Multinomial Logit Regression
We use a multinomial logit regression to examine startup and abandonment decisions. The advantage of a multinomial logit regression is that it allows us to consider the startup and abandonment decisions simultaneously.
is an indicator which is equal to zero if plant i was on standby in year t and operating in year t + 1, equal to one if plant i was on standby both in year t and in year t + 1, equal to two if plant i was on standby in year t and retired in year t + 1, SBT IME i,t is the length of time, in years, that plant i has been shutdown as of year t, and all the other variables are as defined above. The results are presented in Table VIII. 23 The table presents the average marginal effects ∂Prob(I RE = 1)/∂x of each independent (x) variable. For the indicator variable REGU NCERT the table presents the change in the probability of an abandonment when the variable changes from zero to one.
C.1. Startup
The top panel of Table VIII presents regression results for startup from equation (6). As was the case for shutdowns, the individual regressions show that expected future profitability is the single most important factor driving startups. The last column presents the results for the full model. The key drivers of the startup decision are expected future profitability (RM), plant size (SIZE), startup costs (SBT IME), and the regulatory environment (REGU NCERT). Startups are more likely when expected future profitability is higher, for larger plants, and when startup costs are lower. Regulatory uncertainty reduces the probability of starting up a plant which was previously shutdown.
In the individual startup regression the coefficient on spark spread volatility (β 7 = 1.725) is positive and strongly significant. Higher spark spread volatility increases the option value of the plant itself and therefore increases the probability of startup. However, in the overall regression, the coefficient on spark spread volatility (β 7 = 0.613) is reduced in magnitude from the individual regression and is no longer significant. We discuss this further in the "Startup and Plant Size" subsection below.
C.2. Abandonment
The middle panel of Table VIII presents the results for abandonment. The key drivers of the abandonment decision are plant size (SIZE), firm size (T OTCAP), startup cost (SBT IME), and spark spread volatility (SPRDSD).
Importantly, the coefficient on spark spread volatility is negative and strongly significant in both the individual regression and the full regression. Higher spark spread volatility increases the option value of the plant in question and therefore decreases the probability of abandonment.
In the full model, regulatory uncertainty is not important for making the abandonment decision. Because plants which were previously shutdown are "out-of-the-game" already, abandoning the plant has little effect on the firm's cash flows. The prospect of losing customers with the advent of retail competition is therefore less important for abandonment decisions.
C.3. Graphical Representation
Figure 2 plots, on the same graph, the probabilities of startup (OP, red squares), shutdown (SB, blue circles), and abandonment (RE, green triangles) as a function of reserve margin. The figures are based upon the full regression (last column) in Table VIII .
The upper panel presents the cases of regulatory uncertainty (right) and no uncertainty (left). Comparison of the upper panels shows that the existence of regulatory uncertainty has little effect on the probability of abandonment. The probability of abandonment (green triangles) is nearly identical in the upper left and upper right panels.
However, regulatory uncertainty significantly reduces the probability of startup. The probability of startup (red squares) is noticeably reduced in the presence of regulatory uncertainty (upper right panel)
relative to the case of no uncertainty (upper left panel). When plant owners are uncertain about the outcome of retail deregulation and thus about potential gains or losses in retail customers, they delay the decision to restart plants which may otherwise have restarted.
The lower panel of Figure 2 presents the cases of low ($10/MWh, left) and high ($100/MWh, right) spark spread volatility. Comparison of the lower left and lower right panels shows that the probability of startup (red squares) increases with spark spread volatility. 24 As discussed above, this result is due to the option-like nature of a power plant. Higher spark spread volatility increases the option value of the plant and therefore increases the probability of startup.
Comparison of the lower left and lower right panels of Figure 2 shows that spark spread volatility has a significant impact on the probability of abandonment. When spark spread volatility is low, the option value of the plant is low and the probability of abandonment (green triangles) increases as reserve margin increases. However, when spark spread volatility is high, the option value of the plant is high and the probability of abandonment is small regardless of reserve margin. This effect is statistically and economically significant.
D. Startup and Plant Size
In the regression results for startup and abandonment in Table VIII We repeat the regression from equation (6) for small plants, with less than 25 MW capacity. In order to save space we do not report the results in a table. The fit of the overall regression (psuedo-R 2 = 40.3%) is much better than the full sample regression (psuedo-R 2 = 29.0%) reported in Table VIII . The coefficients on the real options variables are reduced in magnitude from the full sample regression. While regulatory uncertainty was signficant in the full sample regressions (β 8 = −0.064, significant at 1%), it is no longer significant when the regression is restricted to small plants. The implication is that regulatory uncertainty matters for startup decisions, but not for the smallest plants.
It is not possible to repeat the multinomial logit regression for large plants because all abandonments involve very small plants. Instead we perform binary logit regression for startup, similar to the full shutdown regression reported in Section V, with the sample limited to plants larger than 25 MW. In order to save space we do not report the results in a table. In contrast to the results presented in Table VIII , the coefficient on spark spread volatility is β 7 = 2.455 and significant at the 1% level. Spark spread volatility is important for startup decisions for all except the smallest plants.
VII. Conclusions
We examine the real options to shutdown, startup, and abandon existing power plants. We find strong evidence of real options effects. Consistent with the theory we find that an increase in spark spread volatility decreases the probability that an operating plant will be shutdown and decreases the probability that a plant which was previously shutdown will be abandoned. We also find that an increase in spark spread volatility increases the probability that a plant which was previously shutdown will be started up.
Regulatory uncertainty, specifically uncertainty about the outcome of deregulation in retail electricity markets, decreases the probability of shutting down plants which are operating and decreases the probability of starting up a plant which was previously shutdown. We find no evidence that regulatory uncertainty affects abandonment decisions. Consider plant i which burns fuel j and is located in region k. The full model is given by
The dependent variable I SB i,t+1 is an indicator which is equal to zero if plant i was operating both in year t and in year t + 1, and equal to one if plant i was operating in year t and shutdown in year t + 1. RM k,t+1 is the projected reserve margin for region k for year t + 1. T 10 t is the ten year treasury bond rate for year t. EFF i is the efficiency of plant i. SIZE i is the capacity of plant i. T OTCAP i is the total capacity for the firm which owns plant i. SPRDSD i jk,t is the standard deviation of year t spark spread for plant i which burns fuel j and is located in region k. REGU NCERT t is the year t retail competition index. The table presents the average marginal effects ∂Prob(I SB = 1)/∂x of each independent (x) variable. For the indicator variables (REGST and REGU NCERT) the table presents the change in the probability of a shutdown when the variable changes from zero to one. * * * indicates significance at the 1% level, * * indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level. Each regression has 6,515 observations. 
RM
+(β 6 * SBT IME i,t ) + (β 7 * SPRDSD i jk,t ) + (β 8 * REGU NCERT t ) + ε.
The dependent variable I OPRE i,t+1 is an indicator which is equal to zero if plant i was on standby in year t and operating in year t + 1, equal to one if plant i was on standby both in year t and in year t + 1, equal to two if plant i was on standby in year t and retired in year t + 1. RM k,t+1 is the projected reserve margin for region k for year t + 1. T 10 t is the ten year treasury bond rate for year t. EFF i is the efficiency of plant i. SIZE i is the capacity of plant i. T OTCAP i is the total capacity for the firm which owns plant i. SBT IME i,t is the length of time, in years, that plant i has been shutdown as of year t. SPRDSD i jk,t is the standard deviation of year t spark spread for plant i which burns fuel j and is located in region k. REGU NCERT t is the year t retail competition index. The table presents the average marginal effects ∂Prob(I SB = 1)/∂x of each independent (x) variable. For the indicator variables (REGST and REGU NCERT) the table presents the change in the probability of a startup when the variable changes from zero to one. * * * indicates significance at the 1% level, * * indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level. Each regression has 1,574 observations. 
Shutdown Probability
The top panel presents the probability of shutting down an operating plant as a function for reserve margin for the cases of regulatory uncertainty (blue circles) and no uncertainty (red squares). The bottom panel presents the probability of shutting down an operating plant as a function for reserve margin for three values of spark spread volatility -$10/MWh (blue circles), $30/MWh (red squares), and $100/MWh (green triangles). 
Startup and Abandonment Probability
For plants which were previously shutdown, the figure present the probability of startup (OP, red squares), remaining on standby (SB, blue circles), and abandonment (RE, green triangles) as a function of reserve margin. The top panel shows the probabilities for no regulatory uncertainty (left) and regulatory uncertainty (right). The bottom panel shows the probabilities for low spark spread volatility of ($10/MWh, left) and high spark spread volatility ($100/MWh right). 
Appendix B. Startup and Shutdown Costs
Most of the problems encountered in restarting a plant are associated with the control system, i.e., instrumentation, electronic controls, and wiring. In general these systems do not vary greatly with the size of the plant in question. Mechanical issues involved in shutdown and restart are primarily concerned with corrosion. Core preservation requires layup chemicals. 26 Restarting a plant begins with checking the control loops. Maintenance personnel attempt to "shootthe-loop", i.e., to check that each control loop is functioning and, if not, to determine where the problem lies. It is common for systems that were in perfect working order at the time the plant was shutdown to fail when restart is attempted.
The costs to restart a plant also can vary with the corporate culture of the owner. Oftentimes maintenance of shutdown plants has a lower priority than maintaining operating plants. A willingness to spend money to maintain these systems while the plant is shutdown greatly reduces the one time cost associated with the actual restart. However, management may not perceive that spending money on a plant which is not currently operating is a wise investment.
The unfortunate (for our purposes) conclusion is that two plants which are the same size, same age, and located in the same region can have very different shutdown and startup costs depending on the priorities of the management team.
In summary, there is no simple way to estimate the costs associated with shutting down and restarting a plant based strictly upon the data available from EIA. Each plant is unique and each firm is unique.
As discussed in the main text, we focus on simple cycle gas turbines only, thereby eliminating variation across technology types. The control system issues discussed above should not vary much with the capacity of the plant. 26 For example, the introduction of nitrogen can prevent oxygen from coming into contact with the core and causing corrosion.
